The information war, a key part of Russia’s large-scale conflict against Ukraine, began long before the annexation of Crimea, the fighting in eastern Ukraine, and the full-scale invasion. Over time, Ukrainian public consciousness was subjected to varying degrees of Russian propaganda.

The armed aggression by Russia in 2014 only completed a process that had started much earlier: the creation of a pro-Russian information space in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. The Kremlin perfected a hybrid warfare tactic in Ukraine: first come Russian TV channels, then Russian tanks.

Since 2014–2015, Ukraine has been building a comprehensive system to counter the information component of Russia’s hybrid war. At the state level, Ukraine has developed strategic communications and mechanisms for timely detection, prevention, and neutralization of real and potential threats to national security in the information sphere.

Developing the Legal Framework for Information Security

Starting in 2015, work began on strategic legal documents that transformed Ukraine’s national information security landscape. A major milestone was the adoption in 2017 of the Doctrine of Information Security of Ukraine, which laid the foundation for state information policy, especially in resisting destructive informational influence.

This Doctrine introduced key concepts such as “strategic communications,” “crisis communications,” and “strategic narrative,” and clearly defined roles and responsibilities among entities involved in implementing state information policy.

Building on this, the Information Security Strategy was adopted just before Russia’s full-scale invasion. It expanded the approaches set out in the Doctrine to protect and develop Ukraine’s information space under conditions of Russian information aggression. This Strategy is planned to be implemented through 2025.

Currently, a new draft document is being prepared to address modern realities and emerging challenges in the information domain. The updated Strategy is expected to be approved by late 2025 or early 2026.

An important legal act supporting national information security is Ukraine’s Media Law (December 2022). It aims to harmonize Ukrainian legislation with European Union standards, introducing key terms and improving regulation of media actors. Notably, it brings online media, bloggers, and various web platforms (such as Netflix and Meta) under regulatory oversight, enabling control over the spread of harmful or false content, including fake news.

Preventive Measures Against the Spread of Russian Narratives

Between 2020 and 2021, Ukraine focused on significantly reducing Russia’s ability to spread its destructive narratives within the country. This effort included:

• Restricting the broadcast of Russian media products: the retransmission of 80 Russian and pro-Russian TV channels in Ukraine, which promoted anti-Ukrainian content, was stopped, alongside blocking Russian internet resources and social networks;
• Imposing sanctions on pro-Russian TV channels such as “112 Ukraine,” “NewsOne,” and “ZIK”;
• Strengthening control over printed materials containing Russian narratives that originated from the aggressor country;
• Introducing national economic sanctions against Russian media outlets, journalists, and public figures;
• Expelling employees of Russian propaganda media from Ukrainian territory.

Institutional Framework for Combating Disinformation

A key challenge for Ukraine remains Russia’s targeted, multifaceted information operations, carried out by the aggressor state using its full arsenal of information warfare tools.

At the Kyiv StratCom Forum 2025, Oleksandr Aleksandrov from Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service revealed that in 2025, Russia spent approximately $1.4 billion solely on propaganda targeting Ukraine. These funds support a multi-level system ranging from TV channels and official media to anonymous outlets, Telegram channels, multilingual platforms, and fake influencers. This structure enables Russia to maintain influence not only over Ukrainian audiences but also globally.

Being on the front lines not only militarily but also in the information war, Ukraine has gained invaluable experience in countering Russian information threats.

To neutralize these threats, Ukraine has developed the institutional component of its state mechanism against disinformation. Between 2021 and 2022, several institutions were established to monitor the information space, identify real or potential threats, and disseminate clarifications, refutations, or warnings about destructive information influences to the public:

• The Centre for Countering Disinformation under the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine (CPD);
• The Centre for Strategic Communications and Information Security within the Ministry of Culture and Strategic Communications of Ukraine (SPRAVDI).

State Measures in the Information Sphere After Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

With the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia, the government’s top priority became ensuring that citizens had timely and reliable information about the situation in the country and on the front lines. That is why, in the very first days of the war, the Ukrainian media community’s initiative to launch a unified, 24/7 information telemarathon was supported. This involved bringing together all nationwide TV channels onto a single information platform called “Telemarathon or UA together” This initiative was later formalized by the President of Ukraine’s Decree No. 152 on March 19, 2022, which approved the National Security and Defense Council’s decision from March 18, 2022, “On the Implementation of a Unified Information Policy During Martial Law”.

However, by the third year of the war, there have been well-founded discussions about whether the unified news telemarathon should continue. An increasing number of experts, journalists, international organizations, and viewers consider this format outdated and unsuitable for modern Ukraine. They also raise concerns that it risks creating a state monopoly over the information space.

In recent years, public demand has shifted, and trust in the unified telemarathon has declined. A 2024 study conducted by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation together with the Razumkov Center’s sociological service showed that 51% of respondents view the telemarathon as an irrelevant source of information, while only 17% consider it relevant. People are increasingly turning to alternative sources for news, especially social media and YouTube.

International Dimension of Ensuring Ukraine’s Information Security

By early 2022, Ukraine’s foreign broadcasting and communication of information about events in the country to the international community were carried out primarily by the Ukrinform News Agency. After Russia’s invasion, the information front needed reinforcement, leading to the launch of the Russian-language TV channel FREEDOM. This channel later expanded into several media brands: UATV English, UATV Arabic, UATV Español, and UATV Português (the latter launched in December 2024).

FREEDOM broadcasts via multiple satellites, covering Europe, North America, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and other regions. It is also available online through its official YouTube channel, providing global access to its content.

Following the full-scale Russian invasion, protecting Ukraine’s information security became a joint effort between Ukraine and the European Union. Thanks to cooperation between Ukrainian authorities and European partners from 2022 to 2025, Russian propaganda’s tools for influencing European audiences and spreading Russian narratives about Ukraine were partially dismantled.

For example, the EU’s sixth sanctions package (June 2022) suspended the broadcast of Russian state media such as Russia RTR/Planet, Russia 24, and TV Centre International within the EU. More recently, the sixteenth sanctions package (February 2025) banned eight additional Russian propaganda outlets, including EADaily, Lenta, NewsFront, RuBaltic, SouthFront, Strategic Culture Foundation, and Krasnaya Zvezda/Tvzvezda.

The Role of Civil Society

Russia’s hybrid information war against Ukraine clearly demonstrated that effective responses to modern security challenges require the consolidation of state institutions and civil society capabilities.

The full-scale invasion reaffirmed that Ukraine’s civil society is a significant actor in ensuring national security, especially in the information domain.

In the early months of the invasion, Ukrainian society united around supporting the defense forces, providing both material and logistical aid, as well as engaging in information warfare.

Today, civil society organizations continue to show their ability to respond to threats facing Ukraine. Many focus on combating disinformation, including initiatives like StopFake, VoxCheck, InformNapalm, and Detector Media.

Preventing and reducing risks from disinformation requires a comprehensive approach: from improving media literacy among the population to involving both civil society and state institutions in rapid responses to information threats.

Looking Ahead

Analyzing Ukraine’s current information security situation amid hybrid warfare reveals that traditional measures – such as media control, bans, and sanctions against disinformation sources – are no longer sufficient to effectively counter information threats.

Given the rapid development of artificial intelligence, the growing role of social media, and the complexity of the information environment, Ukraine must shift to more comprehensive and flexible approaches. These include enhancing media literacy, adopting advanced technological tools to detect and neutralize disinformation, and developing strategic communications at both the state and societal levels.

Such an approach will not only allow for effective responses to current challenges but also build long-term resilience in Ukraine’s information sphere.